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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CHEVRON OIL COMPANY, doing business as 
STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ' 
-vs.-
BEA VER COUNTY, a legislative corporation of 
the State of Utah, HYRUM 1. LEE, EUGENE H. 
MA YER, HOW ARD J PRYOR, constituting the 
Board of Commissioners of Beaver County, 
Defendants and Respondents Case No. 11,317 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, a Delaware 
corporation, DESERET INVESTORS GROUP, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
BEA VER COUNTY, a legislative corporation of 
the State of Utah, HYRUM 1. LEE, EUGENE H. 
MA YER, HOW ARD ]. PRYOR, constituting the 
B':lard of Commissioners of Beaver County, 
Defendants and Respondents. Case No. 11,318 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
RESPO.NDENT'S STATEMENT 
Of THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 11317 and Case No.11318 were consolidated 
for trial and were actions brought attacking ( 1) a zoning 
resolution adopted by Beaver County, and (2) the validity 
of the resolution as applied to the Plaintiffs' property, and 
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Case No. 11318 further attacked the denial by the Board 
of County Commissioners of Beaver County of Plaintiffs' 
petition to have Plaintiffs' property rezoned. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court (C. Nelson Day) held in a memorandum 
decision that (1) the zoning resolution of Beaver County is 
valid and is valid as applied to the Plaintiffs' properties, (2) 
the Board of County Commissioners of Beaver County did 
not act unreasonably in denying the Plaintiffs' petition to 
amend the ordinance and reclassify Plaintiffs' properties, and 
(3) that the Defendants are entitled ro judgment of no cause 
of action. 
From this decision, the Plaintiffs have appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek an aff irmance by the Supreme Court 
of the District Judgment. 
EXPLANATION OF ABREVIATIONS 
The abbreviations used in this Brief, referring to parts 
of the Record, are: (H), the hearing before the Beaver County 
Commission; (R), Record of the trial; and (D), as the depo· 
sition of Dr. Milton Matthews; which was accepted as pare 
of the record of the case, by stipulation of the parties, subject 
to certain objections of the Defendants, which were over-
ruled by the Court (R-175-6). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants agree with plaintiffs' Statement of Facts 
contained in their respective Briefs with the following excep-
tions: 
Defendants contravert that portion of th 1st paragraph 
ot Chevron's statement which states: "No master plan was 
ever designed or adopted either by the Board of Commissioners 
ot the Planning Commission and no survey or study of the 
physical, social or economic conditions within the area was 
ever made, so far as the records disclose." No master plan 
as provided for by Section 17-24-4, U.C.A., 195 3, has been 
adopted in Beaver County, but considerable study as to the 
existing and future economic and social conditions in the 
County was made at the time of the preparation of the Zoning 
Resolution of Beaver County. (R-26j-93). 
Defendants contravert that portion -0f the 10th paragraph 
of Chevron's Statement of Facts which states that the incor-
porated area of Beaver County contains 200 farms. Such 
unincorporated area contains approximately 285 farms. (Pre-
mal order) Defendant~ further contravert that portion of the 
said 10th paragraph which states: "There are no commercial 
enterprises of any kind in the unincorporated area of the 
county except a small, recently-built service station which i~ 
located just outside the city limits of Beaver." The northern 
limits of Beaver City are approximately 80 feet north of 600 
North Street and the Commercial Zone in the County extends 
1,979 feet to the north of said limits as shown by the Zoning 
Map attached to Exhibit 1 and said zone has been extended 
several hundred feet further to the north since the preparation 
of said Zoning Map. At the time of the trial, there existed 
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in said Commercial Zone 5 service stations, 2 restaurants and 
2 petroleum storage plants including one of Phillips Petroleum 
Company. Since the trial, a portion of a Travelodge Motei 
has been constructed in the Commercial Zone. 
Defendants contravert that portion of the 5th paragraph 
of Chevron's Statement of Facts which states: "No other 
property in the county, except that of the companion plaintiffs, 
has such access to the interstate freeway." Other interchanges 
have comparable access. (Exhibits 14 and 15) 
Defendants state the following additional facts: 
The zoning resolution of Beaver County, Utah, adopted 
by the Board of County Commissioners on May 18, 1959, 
being Resolution No. 1-59 and introduced in evidence in 
this case, has not been moditied or amended in any respect 
insofar as the subject property in the present case is con· 
cerned. (Pre-trial Order). 
The only plan for zoning the unincorporated area of 
Beaver County which the Planning Commission or the Board 
of County Commissioners ever adopted consists of the zoning 
resolution HSelt which was passed by the Board of County 
Commissioners as above stated. The text of said Zoning Reso· 
lution has been amended since the adoption of said resolution, 
but such amendments do not affect this litigation since neither 
the requirements governing the G-1 Grazing Zone nor the 
requirements governing the H-1 Highway Service Zone were 
thereby modified. Sai<l zoning resolution covers all of the 
unincorporated territory in the County, but no master plan, 
as provided for by Section 1 7-27-4, Utah CoJe Annotated, 
1953, was ever adopted. (Pre-trial Order). 
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The only map of such unincorporated territory 
made by the Planning Commission as part of the plan is 
rhe map which was imroducd in evidence at che pre-trial as 
a part of Exhibit No. l. Some of the property shown on said 
map have been rezoned by preceedings which have identified 
the properties affected by metes and bounds descriptions; 
however, none of the property involved in this action and no 
property in the near vicinity thereof has been rezoned. (Pre-
mal Order). 
Chevron Oil Company is the record owner of the property 
Jescribed in paragraph ''l'' of its complaint on file in this 
matter. At the time of the adoption of said zoning resolution, 
said property was a part of a larger tract consisting of at least 
360 acres owned by one Ellis Yardley. The property now 
owned by Chevron Oil Company was first severed from the 
said larger tract by a conveyance thereof {rom the said 
Yardley to Deseret Investors Group in November, 1964, and 
conveyed from Deseret Investors Group to Chevron Oil 
Company in August, 1965. (Pre-trial Order). Said property 
belonging to Chevron contains approximately 5 acres. (Chev-
ron's Complaint). 
Phillips Petroleum Company is the record owner of the 
property described in paragraph "l" of its complaint on file 
in this matter. At the time of the adoption of said zoning 
resolution, said property was a part of a larger tract consisting 
of 120 acres owned by one Turner. The property now owned 
by Phillips Petroleum Company was first severed from the 
said larger tract and conveyed to Phillips Petroleum Company 
in September, 1964. (Pre-trial Order) Said property belonging 
ro Phillips containing approximately 10 acres. (Phillips Com-
plaint) 
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The property which Deseret Investors Group seeks to 
have rezoned was acquired by Deseret Investors Group in 1964. 
The land sought to be rezoned is a small portion of the land 
so acquired. (Exhibits 28 and 29; Deseret's Complaint). 
The properties owned by Chevron Oil Company and 
Phillips Petroleum Company above mentioned abut on U.~. 
Interstate Highway 15 and on the proposed Milford Highway, 
and are located at what is called the Pine Creek Interchange, 
which interchange is south of the boundary line between 
Millard County and Beaver County, and is approximately 
rwenty-one (21) miles North of the city of Beaver. (Pre-trial 
Order) The town of Kanosh in Millard County and the towns 
of Joseph and Sevier in Sevier County are within 25 miles 
of the Pine Creek Interchange and are located North and 
Northeast, respectively, of the Pine Creek Interchange. (R-48-
50) The settlement of Cove Fort is located approximately 3 
miles nonh of the Pine Creek Interchange. 
The unincorporated area of Beaver County is for the 
most part public domain and state-owned land. A large part 
of it is either mountains or uncultivated land: There· are abour 
285 farms in the area. The census fixes the emire population 
of the county at 4,235. This includes a population of 1,653 
in the city of Beaver, 1,556 in the city of Milford and about 
550 in the town of Minersville. The county consists of approxi· 
mately 2,750.00 square miles and all of the area is unincor· 
porated with the exception of the cities of Beaver and Milford 
and the town of Minersville. (Pre-trial Order). 
The lands involved in these actions were used for grazing 
and suited for grazing when the Zoning Resolution was adopt· 
ed in 1959, (R-266-268; Exhibit l) and such lands are still 
smted tor grazing. (R-101). 
.., 
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When the freeway is completed, it will pass along the 
western edge of Beaver City 5 blocb west of the existing 
Main Street. (R-53). There is no zoning in Beaver City so 
there is no restriction on the use of property within the city 
boundaries. There is vacant space in the Commercial Zone 
north ot Beaver City where commercial businesses could be 
established, (D-7 3) and there is also considerable area south 
ot Beaver City bordering Highway U.S. 91 which will pro-
vide access to the freeway where commercial businesses can 
be locatc<l if the property is rezoned. (D-70-72). Plaintiffi 
Chevron and Phillips have petroleum outlets in Beaver City, 
(R-45; H-)1) and said plaintiffs were invited by the Beaver 
County Planning Commission to come into the available 
space in or near Beaver City to construct their proposed new 
tacilities. (Exhibit 17) The economy of eastern Beaver County 
is heavily dependent on tourist business with. substantial1y 
more than one-third of the retail sales in Beaver City being 
made at service stations, restaurants, motels, etc. (D-64-65) 
The existing tourist facilities in and near Beaver City are 
generally sufficient. (D-67). 
Most of the existing communities of Southern Utah are 
m serious need of economic growth. They are already too 
small to provide all of the community sei:vjces that modern 
living demands. Beaver City has one doctor, one drug store, 
one hospital recently acquired, one laundromat, on dry clean-
ing establishment, one barber shop, one ladies clothing store, 
one mens clothing store, one moving picture theater, etc. Any 
substantial reduction in the business activity in or near Beaver 
City would likely result in the loss of any one or all of those 
services. (R-288-9). 
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Since the trial in this action, the State Highway Depart-
ment of Utah and the Bureau of Public Roads have changed 
their policy and have redesigned the interchanges at both ends 
of Beaver City so as to enable traffic at either interchange 
traveling in either direction to both leave and return to the 
freeway and proceed in either direction when returning to 
the freeway, commonly called 4-way movement interchanges. 
This will permit easy access to an<l from the freeway at each 
end of Beaver City for all freeway travelers, at least equal to 
the access at Pine Creek Hill. Beaver City is now in the 
process of annexing to its corporate area the properties con-
tained in the present Commercial Zone north of Beaver City 
as well as the additional properties to the interchange and Jt 
is virtually certain that such annexation will be completed in 
the near future thus enabling commercial development to the 
mtcrchange. The traveling public can be better served in and 
near Beaver City than at Pine Creek because of the additional 
l>ervices available in the community. 
Beaver County furnishes tire protection in the unincor-
porated territory of the County. The law enforcement person-
nel which the County finances consists of a county sheriff, one 
full-time chief deputy and one part-time deputy an<l a county 
attorney. Beaver County has a health department consisting 
of the Board of County Commissioners, a health officer and 
a public health nurse. 
There are other interchanges :ilong Highway 1-15 in 
in Beaver County which provide access to the freeway corn· 
parable to that at Pine Creek Interchange and which could 
be adapted to commercial uses. (Exhibits 14 and 15). 
The Beaver County Commissioners provided for an 
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H-1 Highway-Service Zone m the Zoning Resolution so 
that land could be zoned tor that use at some future time it 
an<l when need therefor arises, but they made no legislative 
determination that such a zone was needed at the time of 
the adoption of the Resolution or at any otner specihc rim.:. 
(R-287-8). As contrasted to the 24 miles trom Beaver City 
north to Cove Fort and the 31 miles trom Beaver City south 
w Paragonah, it is approximately 70 miles from the city of 
Milford in Beaver County west along Highway U-21 to the 
next community which is Garrison in Millard County. (Ex-
hibit l). U 21 is an improved highway in that area and 
provides a direct route trom Highway 1-70 where it dead 
ends near Cove Fort, Utah, to central Nevada and central 
California points. Therefore, the highway running west of 
Milford to the Beaver-Millard county line is an area where 
highway services between existing communities would be 
most needed in the future. 
The County Planning Commission which originally draft-
ed the Zoning Resolution of Beaver County and the County 
Planning Commission which considered plaintiffs' petition 
tor rezoning, and the Board of County Commissioners which 
originally adopted the Zoning Resolution and the Board 
ot County Commissioners which considered plaintiffs'· petition 
tor rezoning, represented a variety of economic and social 
interests in the county and much study was made before the 
Resolution was adopted. (R-405-409; R-263-293). 
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POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I 
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEA VER 
COUNTY IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
BEING CONFISCATORY OF PLAINTIFFS' 
PROPER TIES. 
POINT II 
NEITHER THE INITIAL ADOPTION OF THE 
ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER COUNTY, 
NOR THE REFUSAL BY THE BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS TO REZONE 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPECTIVE PROPER TIES PUR-
SUANT TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITIONS, WAS 
UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY OR CAPRI• 
CIOUS. 
A. 
ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION WAS NOT·· 
COUNTY'S OBJECTIVE. 
B. 
PUBLIC NEED MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST 
PRIVATE INTEREST. 
1 1 
c. 
STABILITY OF ZONING PLAN NECESSARY. 
D. 
TOTAL TAX BASE MIGHT BE REDUCED. 
E. 
lNCREASbD COST OF COUNTY POLICE, FIRE, 
Ht:ALTH A1\JD OTHER SERVICES. 
F. 
NO PUBLIC NEED FOR PINE CREEK FACILI-
TIES. 
G. 
ALL 11\JTERCHANGt:S COULD DEMAND 
Rt.ZONING. 
H. 
DlFFlCULT TO SUPERVISE CONDUCT IN 
RbMOTE AREA. 
I. 
PLAINTIFFS Ht\ vE NO COMPELLING PRI-
VATE NEED. 
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]. 
COUNTY COMMISSION KNOWS LOCAL 
NEEDS. 
POINT III 
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEA VER 
COUNTY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A LEGIS-
LATIVE DETERMINATION THAT HIGHWAY 
SERVICE FACILITIES ARE NEEDED AT PINE 
- -
CREEK HILL THEREBY REQUIRING A RE-
ZONING OF PLAINTIFFS' PROPER TIES AS 
H-1 HIGHWAY SERVICE. 
A. 
ZONING RESOLUTION ,OF BEA VER COUNTY 
DOES NOT FREEZE BUSINESS. 
B. 
INTENTION WAS TO DEFER DESIGNATION 
OF LAND AS HIGHWAY SER VICE UNTIL 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. 
POINT IV 
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEA VER 
COUNTY IS NOT VOID AS CONTENDED BY 
PLAINTIFFS PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COM-
P ANY AND DESERET INVESTORS GROUP 
BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT IT STATES 
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IN ITS PREAMBLE TO BE FOR THE BENEFIT 
OF THE INHABITANTS OF BEAVER COUNTY 
RATHER THAN THE INHABITANTS OF 
THE ST A TE OF UT AH. 
POINT V 
THE ADOPTION OF A MASTER PLAN IS NOT 
A PRE-REQUISITE TO THE ADOPTION BY 
A COUNTY OF A ZONING RESOUUTION. 
POINT VI 
BEA VER COUNTY'S ZONING IS NOT A 
BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
POINT VII 
THE ABSENCE OF FORMAL FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PRO-
VIDES NO GROUND FOR ALTERATION OF 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ACTION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER 
COUNTY IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
BEING CONFISCATORY OF PLAINTIFFS' 
PROPER TIES. 
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Plaintiffs' contention that the Zoning Resolution of Beaver 
County is unconstitutional and void in that it is confiscatory 
of plaintiffs' properties is without merit. 
In all of the cases relied upon by plaintiffs in support 
of their contention, either the property involved was not suited 
for the purpose for which it was zoned at the time of the 
adoption of the zoning ordinance or the property became un· 
suited for the purpose for which it was zoned after the adoption 
of the zoning ordinance because of a change in circumstances. 
in the case at bar, the lands involved were used for 
and were suited for grazing at the time of the adoption of the 
Zoning Resolution in 1959 and they continu<: to be as suited 
for grazing now as they ever were so far as their productivity 
and other characteristics are concerned. The difference is that 
the plaintiffs, several years after the adoption of the Zoning 
Resolution, voluntarily severed the lands involved in this 
litigation from the larger tracts of which they were formerly 
a part. Grazing lands of this character must be used in relatively 
large tracts. The plaintiffs spernlated that the lands could be 
rezoned and now, upon learning that they miscalculated the 
attitude of the zonin3 authority, they wish to have the court 
rectify their mistake. If a land owner can divide his land into 
small parcels and fore= a rezoning on the basis that the land as 
so divided is no longer suited for the purpose for which it was 
zoned as plaintiffs are attempting to do in this case, no zoning 
authority can hereafter adopt a binding regulation zoning land 
as agricultural, grazing or other use that necessarily requires 
a large tract. The presence of the freeway has not deprived 
the land of its suitability for grazing any more than the pre· 
sence of Highway U.S. 91 has done in the past. 
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An argument similar to that made by the plaintiffs in 
this case was presented to this court in the case of Douse v. 
Salt Lake City, 123 U. 107, 255 P. 2d 723, wherein the 
plaintiff alleged that his property was zoned for residential 
but it was not suited for residential and it had a greater value 
as commercial or industrial property and the existing zoning 
was, therefore, unconstitutional as t0 his property as being 
confiscatory. In rejecting the plaintiffs' argument in that case, 
this court said: 
"In this jurisdiction the discretionary power to district 
and zone cities for various purposes incident to the 
public interesr is granted to the governing body of 
the city by stature. Sec. 10-9-1, 2, 3, U. C. A. 1953. 
Palpably the excercise of the zoning power is a legis-
lative function and activity. Walton v. Tracy Loan 
& Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P. 2d 7 24, 726. The 
wisdom of the plan, the necessity, the number, nature 
and boundaries of the district are matters which lie in 
the discretion of the City authorities, and only if their 
action is confiscatory, discriminatory or arbitrary may 
the court set aside their action. Marshall v. Salt Lake 
City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P. 2d 704, 149 A. L. R. 
282. The fact that plaintiff's one-half lot might be 
more profitably used for commercial than for resi-
dential purposes, or indeed, the fact that it has become 
unsuited for residential purposes does not show dis-
crimination or reveal arbitrary action. 
POINT II 
NEITHER THE INITIAL ADOPTION OF THE 
ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER COUNTY. 
NOR THE REFUSAL BY THE BOARD OF 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS TO REZONE 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPECTIVE PROPERTIES PUR-
SUANT TO PLAINTIFFS' PETITIONS, WAS 
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UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY OR CAPRl-
CIOUS. 
The decision on a zoning question of the county commis-
sioners, city council or other zoning authority will not be set 
aside and the court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the zoning authority unless the decision of the zoning 
authority is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. This pro-
position has been the holding of several decisions of this court 
including the following: Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 
U. 2d 307, 358 pl 2d 633; Salt Lake County v. Hutchinson, 
8 U. 2d 154, 329 P. 2d 657; Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 
U. 111, 141 P. 2d 704; Dowse v. Salt Lake City, 123 U. 107, 
255 P. 2d 723; Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 
116 U. 536, 212 P. 2d 177; Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 17 U 
2d, 300, 410 P. 2d, 764. 
In Gayland v. Salt Lake County, supra, the foregoing 
principle is clearly stated as follows: 
"In zoning, as in any legislative action, the functioning 
authority has wide discretion. Its action is endowed 
with a presumption of validity; and it is the court's 
duty to resolve all do:Jbts in favor thereof and not to 
interfere with the Commission's action unless it clearly 
appears to be beyond its power; or is unconstitutional 
for some such reason as it deprives one of property 
without due process of law, or capriciously and arbi-
trarily infringes upon his rights therein. or is unjustly 
discriminatory. The burden was upon the plaintiff to 
show that the Commission's action was suffused with 
one or more of those faults, which burden has not 
been sustained. Even though it be true that informa-
tion was presented at the h::-aring which would h~ve 
justified the Commission in amf'nding the. zon~ng 
ordiPance as advocated. it is also rrue that the s1tuanon 
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presented can be so viewed as to point to the conclusion 
that the action taken was reasonable and proper. Under 
such circumstances it was not the prerogative of the 
court to substitute its judgment for that of the Com-
mission." 
The statute which defines the purposes for which zoning 
may be done by a county is Section 17-27-13, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, which states: 
"Such regulations shall be designed and enacted for 
the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, 
convenience, order, prosperity or welfare of the present 
and future inhabitants of the state of Utah, including, 
amongst other things, the lessening of congestion in 
the streets or roads or reducing the waste of excessive 
amounts of roads, securing safety from fire and other 
dangers, providing adequate light and air, classification 
of land uses and distribution of land development and 
utilization, protection of the tax base, securing economy 
in governmental expenditures, fostering the state's 
agricultural and other industries, and the protection of 
both urban and nonurban development." 
As the subjunchve "or" is used in this statute, the county 
commissioners act within the· power· granted if the zoning 
regulations fulfill any one of the stated purposes. Zoning 
the plaintiffs' properties involved in these actions as G-1 
Grazing is reasonable and within the power granted as shown 
by the following: 
ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION WAS NOT 
COUNTY'S OBJECTIVE. 
It is contended by plaintiff that the Zoning Resolution 
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of Beaver County was adopted and is being adnunistered for 
the purpose of eliminating competition for the business men 
in Beaver City. Defendants deny this contention. There are 
several locations within the corporate limits of Beaver City 
and in the Commercial Zone north of Beaver City where 
commercial businesses to serve the traveling public as well 
as local residents can be established. (D-73) There is also 
considerable area south of Beaver City bordering Highway 
U.S. 91 which will provide access to the freeway where com-
mercial businesses can be located. (D-70-72) This area is 
presently zoned A-1 Agricultural but it can be rezoned to C-1 
Commercial if and when demand and need dictate. (Exhibit 
1) Such new businesses would compete with the now existing 
businesses. The existing businesses include numerous service 
stations, motels and restaurants and they presently compete 
among themselves. It is obvious that competition has not 
been eliminated in the area and is not likely to be done in 
the future. Whenever an application is made to rezone pro-
perty for commercial use and there are existing similar com-
mercial areas in the same vicinity, the same question of elimi-
nation of competition can arise; however, although zoning 
cannot be used for the expressed purpose of eliminating com-
petition to existing businesses, the zoning authority may deny 
such applications for rezoning if such denial is otherwise 
proper even though competition is in fact incidentally thereby 
reduced. 
In Gayland v. Salt Lake County, supra, the dispute was 
as to the attempt to rezone 10 acres of land in the vicinity of 
1300 East and 5600 South Streets in :::ialt Lake County south 
east of Salt Lake City from residential (R-2) to commercial 
(C-2). The County Commissioners denied the application and 
rhe Supreme Court up he Id that action. The applicant desired 
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to construct a shopping center on the land to be rezoned. By 
denying this applICation, rhe compernion which the proposed 
new shopping center would have presented to other existing 
shoppmg centers which could serve the same customers was 
eliminated. This tact, however, did not deprive the County 
Commissioners of the right to deny the application. 
In Douse v. Salt Lake City, supra, the property sought 
to be rezoned was zoned residential in an area where several 
blocks in the immediate vicinity were zoned commercial. The 
applicant alleged that his property had potential commeroal 
or industrial value. The application for rezoning was denied 
and the Supreme Court upheld the denial. lt is obvious mar 
competition with the nearby commercial areas was thereby 
eliminated. 
Since there are numerous service stations in Beaver City, 
one of which is owned by plaint1tt Pnillips _t}ecroleum Com-
pany and one of which is owned by plaintiff Chevron Oil 
Company, it is ridiculous to suppose that the Beaver County 
Commissioners would attempt to prohibit competition by 
rhese plaintifts and other oil companies at Pine Creek Hill 
from the existing facilities ot these two plaintiffs and other 
011 companies located in Beaver City. 
B. 
PUBLIC NEED MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST 
PRIVATE INTEREST. 
ln determining whether or not a zoning decision is 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, the public need must 
be wt1ghed against the private interest of the property owner. 
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Most ot the existing communities of Southern 'Utah are 
m serious need of economrc growm. Tney are a!feaay too 
small to provide all ot the community servrces that modern 
llvmg demands. Beaver City has one doctor, one drug store, 
one hospital recently acquired, one laundromat, one dry clean· 
mg estabhshment, one barber shop, one ladies clothing store, 
one mens clothmg store, one moving picture theater, ere. 
Any substantial reduction in the busmess activity in or near 
Beaver City would likely result in the loss of any one or all 
oi those servrces. A lack of such services makes it difficult 
1r not impossible to attract teachers, mdustry and other res1· 
dents to come to the area and the disintegration of community 
11te contmues until 1t is virtually eliminated. (R-288-9) What 
is in the best interest ot the inlrnbitants or me mcorporated 
areas ot Beaver County 1s a1so m me best mterest or the 
mhabitants ot the unmcorporared areas as each is dependent 
upon the other. Therefore, it is in the best interest of all of 
the residents ot Beaver County that tuture commercial busi· 
nesses be encouraged to locate in or near t11e existing com· 
munities. Permiting the small business centers to be divided 
into more smaller busmess centers whrch will occur if plaintiffs' 
property at Pine Creek Hill is rezoned for commercial use, 
will result in a break down of the business climate and a 
scattering or the smail population centers into still smaller 
centers and the deterioration oi commumty life. (R-288-SJJ. 
There is nothing in this record to indicacte any effort to freeze 
business at its present level. The theory of plaintiffs' evidence 
seems to be that a commercial development at Pine Creek 
Hill will bring new rourist business into the area, but such 
is not the case. Such a development will create no new market 
demand. Either the traveling public will acquire their goods 
and services at Pine Creek Hill or at some other location in 
the same area for they will not and cannot continue to some 
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remote area to acquire gasoline, food, sleeping accomodations 
and other facilities. Therefore, a development at Pine Creek 
Hill would not add to the economic growth of the area in 
any respect. 
The business at Pine Creek Hill would be dependent 
almost entirely upon tourist trade, and, as tourist trade fluctu-
ates greatly between the summer and winter seasons, rm: 
personnel needed to operate the Pine Creek Hill installations 
would also fluctuate and would probably be imported from 
remote areas so that the opportunity tor employment at these 
facilities for the local residents would be diminished compared 
m what it would be if the taoht1es were near the existing 
communities where the business would be more dependent 
on local trade and more uniform. Contrary to plaintiffs' con-
tention, there is no assurance that the employees at Pine Creek 
Hill would reside or spend their money in Beaver County. 
(R-45-51) 
c. 
STABILITY OF ZONING PLAN NECESSARY. 
Another public need is stability in land use so that land 
owners can anticipate with some degree of certainty the future 
economic and social developmc:i.t. This is one of the purposes 
for which zoning was devised. Development without zoning 
is peace meal and eratic. To rezone whenever a land owne1 
is <lispleasd with the present arrangement jeopardizes such 
stability. Rezoning should be done only upon a determination 
that it will not seriously and adversly affect the remainder of the 
community. If the County Commissioners in the case at bar 
are not sustained in their designation of where commercial 
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developments are to be located in Beaver County, then the 
legislative power of zoning authorities throughout the state 
to classify land according to its use will be seriously jeopardized. 
D. 
TOT AL TAX BASE MIGHT BE REDUCED. 
Plaintiffs' attempt to show that the proposed development 
at Pine Creek Hill would increase the tax base of Beaver 
County. It is true that the assessed value of plaintiffs' property 
would increase when the proposed improvement would become 
completed, but the damage which the development would 
have on the rest of the county as above shown would eventually 
result in a greater decrease of tax base elsewhere than plain-
tiffs' property would be increased. As the general business 
climate and community life disintegrated and residents moved 
out of the county. the tax base would eventually seriously 
decrease. 
E. 
INCREASED COST OF COUNTY POLICE, FIRE, 
HEALTH AND OTHER SERVICES. 
A commercial development at Pine Creek Hill would 
result in increased cost of county government services. Beaver 
County does have a fire department 'lnd has law enforcement 
officials and both would be called upon to render aid when 
the need would arise. (R-60-61) Families residing at Pine 
Creek Hill would also need to have their children transported 
to school. (R-290) An area so remote from the community 
would attract those persons who wish to escape the restrictions 
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ot the law and a law enforcemem problem would result. 
Health and sanitation at this remote location would also create 
additional cost and law enforcement problems to the county. 
It is inevitable that these governmental services would be 
required regardless of plaintiffs' present plans to provide some 
of these services by themselves. If all of the properties involved 
in these two actions were to be zoned Highway-Service, 
numerous facilities of various types could be constructed there-
by involving the county to a much greater extent than the 
rwo service stations now anticipated by Chevron and Phillips. 
(Exhibit 1, 8-5-2; H-41-42; R-50-51) 
F. 
NO PUBLIC NEED FOR PINE CREEK FACI-
LITIES. 
There is no public need for commercial facilities at Pine 
Creek Hill. The proposed development is approximately 21 
miles north of Beaver City and approximately the same dis-
tance south of the town of Kanosh, and that distance requires 
less than 20 minutes of -driving at permitted freeway speed 
and slightly more than one gallon of gasoline. The occasional 
motorist who finds himself m immediate need of service 
between Beaver and Kanosh can acquire most automotive 
services at Cove Fort which is approximately 3 miles north of 
Pine Creek Hill. The tourist facilities at Beaver are healthful, 
decent and generally sufficient (D-65-67) and can be added 
to as need requires. The same can also be done at Kanosh, 
Fillmore, Cedar City and other communities along the high-
way. The evidence in the record indicates that highway traffic 
must leave the freeway when going into Beaver City and 
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continue through the entire length of Beaver's Main Street 
in order to return to the freeway at the interchange on the 
other end. Since the trial in this action, the State Highway 
Department of Utah and the Bureau of Public Roads have 
changed their policy and have redesigned the interchanges 
at both ends of Beaver City so as to enable traffic at either 
interchange traveling in either direction to both leave and 
rerurn to the freeway and proceed in either direction when 
rerurning to the freeway, commonly called 4-way movement 
interchanges. This will permit easy access to and from the 
freeway at each end of Beaver City for all freeway travelers, 
at least equal to the access at Pine Creek Hill. Beaver City 
is now in the process of annexing to its corporate area the 
properties contained in the present Commercial Zone north 
of Beaver City as well as the additional properties to the 
interchange and it is virtually certain that such annexation will 
be completed in the near furure, thus enabling commercial 
development to the interchange. The traveling public can be 
better served in and near Beaver City than at Pine Creek 
because of the additional services available in the community. 
G. 
ALL INTERCHANGES COULD DEMAND RE-
ZONING. 
If rezoning is done at the interchange at Pine Creek 
Hill, the county will have no justification to refuse rezoning 
at all other interchanges along the freeway. Modern engineer· 
ing techniques make it possible to adapt an area to the srruc· 
rural and topographical needs of a commercial installation 
so that topographic considerations now have lesser importance. 
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Other interchanges provide comparable access with Pine Creek 
Hill for highway travelers. (Exhibits 14 and 15) The result 
would be a series of small oases in the desert. 
H. 
DIFFICULT TO SUPERVISE CONDUCT IN 
REMOTE AREA. 
With the development of motels, trailer courts and 
restaurants at Pine Creek Hill, its distance from incorporated 
communities would make it attractive for young people who 
wish to escape from the supervision or their parents and law 
enforcement officials. The result could be liquor violations. 
gambling, sexual offenses, drug traffic and other associated 
offenses which would be difficult to control, thereby causing 
a serious threat to morals. 
I. 
PLAINTIFFS HA VE NO COMPELLING PRI-
VATE NEED. 
As contrasted to the public need to sustain the district 
court's decision, as above set forth, there is no substantial 
private interest to be served by rezoning Pine Creek Hill. 
Plaintiffs' and other petroleum dealers have numerous outlets 
up and down the freeway. Their customers must obtain their 
products and services in order to travel and they can be obtain-
ed whereever available. A development at Pine Creek Hill 
will neither add to the number of plaintiffs' customers nor to 
the number of travelers upon the highway nor to the amount 
of products and services which plaintiffs would sell. Plaintiffs 
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will incure no loss in the operation of their businesses. The 
same principals apply to other facilities that might be con-
structed at Pine Creek Hill. 
J. 
COUNTY COMMISSION KNOWS LOCAL 
NEEDS. 
The County Planning Commission which originally draft-
ed the Zoning Resolution of Beaver County and the County 
Planning Commission which considered plaintiffs' petition for 
rezoning, and the Board of County Commissioners which 
originally adopted the Zoning Resolution and the Board of 
County Commissioners which considered plaintiffs' petition 
for rezoning represented a variety of economic and social 
interests in the county and much study was made before· the 
Resolution was adopted. (R-405-409; R-263-293) 
The evidence is adundant that Eastern Beaver County 
is highly_deRendent upon tourist business in its economy, and 
the county Commissioners should be left _to_ determine how 
best the County can benefit from that tourist business. Mr. 
Burnham testified that rezoning Pine Creek Hill would be 
iri the best interest of the county while Mr. Dispain testified 
that it would not be in the best interest of the County to 
re~on~ Pine Creek Hill. If these two informed experts honestly 
differ on the question, how can it be said that the County 
Commissioners were unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious 
in their decision? 
POINT III 
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEAVER 
COUNTY DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A LEGIS-
LATIVE DETERMINATION THAT HIGHWAY 
SERVICE FACILITIES ARE NEEDED AT PINE 
CREEK HILL THEREBY REQUIRING A RE-
ZONING OF PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTIES AS 
H-1 HIGHWAY SER VICE. 
A. 
ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEA VER COUNTY 
DOES NOT FREEZE BUSINESS. 
In support of plaintiffs' contention that such a legislativ~ 
determination was made thereby requiring a zoning of their 
properties for highway service facilitiel>, they cite the cases. of 
Ex Parte White, 234 Pac 396; Wickham v. Becker, 274 
Pac. 397. 
Both of those cases were appa:ently decided upon_ the 
fact that the zoning regulation adopted provided no land for 
commercial use other than that then being used for that pur-
pose so that no commercial expansion was possible. In the 
case at bar there is additional land provided in the Commercial 
Zone that is not now being used for commercial purposes 
(D. 7 3) and the plaintiffs, rather than being denied of the 
right to conduct business, were invited into ·the established 
commercial area: (Exhibit 17.) 
B. 
INTENTION WAS TO DEFER DESIGNATION 
OF LAND AS HIGHWAY SERVICE UNTIL 
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. 
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The intention of the County Commissioners was clearly 
stated by Dale Dispain in his testimony: (R-287-8) The only 
legislative determination that was made was that there might 
be a need at some future time for highway service facilities 
along a freeway several miles from an existing community, 
but no determination as to place, time or condition was made. 
The decision of whether or not to create a highway-service 
zone and, if so, where, how many, etc., were left for future 
determination. That question was def ered by the County 
Commissioners at the time of the adoption of the Zoning 
Resolution and it should continue to be defered for decision 
by them in their continuing legislative function in the zoning 
field. Plaintiffs' contention that Pine Creek Hill is the logical 
place for a highway-service zone becomes untenable when the 
zoning map attached to Exhibit 1 is examined and the long 
distance appears between the City of Milford along the high-
way running west to where it intersects with the northern 
boundary line of Beaver County. It is approximately 50 mile> 
from Milford to the county line and approximately 70 miles 
from Milford to the next community which is Garrison, in 
Millard County. If a0d when a freeway were to be built 
connecting Milford and Garrison as a connecting link between 
Highway I-7 0 and the West Coast, highway-service facilities 
would be far more logical in that area than along I-15 north 
of Beaver City. 
POINT IV 
THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF BEA VER 
COUNTY IS NOT VOID AS CONTENDED BY 
PLAINTIFFS PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COM-
PANY AND DESERET INVESTORS GROUP 
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BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT IT STATES 
IN ITS PREAMBLE TO BE FOR THE BENEFIT 
OF THE INHABITA.i'-!TS OF BEA VER COUNTY 
RATHER THAN THE INHABITANTS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
A county zoning resolution is not void be reason of the 
fact that its preamble states that i~ is adopted tor the benefit 
of the inhabitants of the county adopting it. Such a statement 
contains no implication that the purpose ot the ordinance is 
contrary to the interest ot the remaining inhabitants of the 
state. It is not necessary that a zoning resolution have a pre· 
amble at all. The determining test is what the ordinance 
actually does, that is, whether its provisions in fact benefit the 
present and future inhabitants of the State of Utah or whether 
they actually are against the interest of such inhabitants. The 
Zoning Resolution of Beaver County does benetit the present 
and future inhabitants of the State of Utah and it contains 
no provision to the contrary. (Exhibit 1) 
POINT V 
THE ADOPTION OF A MASTER PLAN IS NOT 
A PRE-REQUISITE TO THE ADOPTION BY 
A COUNTY OF A ZONING RESOUUTION. 
While plaintiffs do not argue in their briefs that the 
adoption of a master plan is a ·pre-requisite to the adoption 
by a county of a zoning resolution, they do assert the fact 
that Beaver County did not adopt a master plan prior to the 
adoption of the Zoning Resolution of Beaver County in 1959. 
The adoption of a master plan is provided for by Section 
17-27-4, et seq, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and the adoption 
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of a zoning resolution is provided for by Section 17-27-9, 
et seq, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Either can be adopted 
by a county but neither is a pre-requisite to the other. This 
question was decided as herein stated by the case of Gayland 
v. Salt Lake County, 11 U. 2d 307, 358 P. 2d 633. 
POINT VI 
BEA VER COUNTY'S ZONING IS NOT A 
BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
The contention of plaintiffs Phillips Petroleum Company 
and Deseret Investors Group that the Zoning Resolution of 
Beaver County burdens interstate commerce is without merit. 
If such a contention is valid, then interstate travelers have 
been similarly burdened throughout all of the time that they 
have been using the highways of the nation because highways 
used by interstate travelers have customarily passed through 
communities and interstate travelers have been required to 
pass through communities whether needing services or nor 
until the very recent development of the freeway system in 
some parts of the nation. Even viewing the Zoning Resolution 
of Beaver County in the light proposed by plaintiffs, travelers 
needing services while in Beaver County would be required to 
travel only a few city blocks further than their fellow traveler:; 
who do not need such services. However, with the recenr 
developments since the trial of the planned four-way inter· 
changes at each access from Highway I-15 to Beaver City and 
the anticipated commercial expansion particularly to the north· 
em interchange, travelers on I-15 will have as convenient 
access to highway services in and near Beaver City as can be 
made available at Pine Creek Hill and the services available 
will probably be more extensive. 
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POINT .VII 
THE ABSENCE OF FORMAL FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PRO-
VIDES NO GROUND FOR ALTERATION OF 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ACTION. 
In view of the rulings contained in the Memorandwn 
Decision of the district court in these actions and in view oi 
the fact that it was obvious that an appeal would be on the 
whole record as has been the case, it is difficult to see that 
findings of fact and more formal conclusions of law would 
have served any worth while purpose. However, defendants 
have no objection to the entry of formal findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and judgment so long as they are in accord 
with the Memorandum Decision. It is to be observed that 
no plaintiff proposed or requested any additional documents 
and that the respective notices of appeal were based upon the 
Memorandum Decision. Therefor, findings of fact and con-
clusions of law were in effect waived so far as the appeal 
1s concerned. 
If the failure to make findings of fact does not prejudice 
any party, the error is harmless. (Leighton v. One William 
Street Fund, 343 F 2d 565) No prejudice has been alleged 
in the case at bar. 
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SUMMARY 
The Zoning Resolution of Beaver County is valid in its 
entirety and as applied to plaintiffs' properties, and the Board 
of County Commissioners acted reasonably and within their 
lawful powers in denying plaintiffs' application for rezoning. 
The Supreme Court should affirm the District Court's judg-
ment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN 0. CHRISTIANSEN 
A. M. FERRO 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents. 
